Beginning in v1.4.1 and prior to v1.4.9, due to an incomplete fix for CVE-2021-24031, the Zstandard command-line utility created output files with default permissions and restricted those permissions immediately afterwards. Output files could therefore momentarily be readable or writable to unintended parties.

• https://github.com/facebook/zstd/issues/2491
• https://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=982519
• https://www.facebook.com/security/advisories/cve-2021-24032

In Miniz 2.0.7, tinfl_decompress in miniz_tinfl.c has an infinite loop because sym2 and counter can both remain equal to zero.

• https://github.com/richgel999/miniz/issues/90

Sereal::Decoder versions before 5.005 for Perl allow heap out-of-bounds read via crafted input. In Perl/Decoder/srl_decoder.c, srl_read_object() and srl_read_hash() process a COPY tag, a back-reference whose target byte the decoder re-decodes as a fresh tag. When that target byte matches the SHORT_BINARY pattern (an inline string whose length is encoded in the low bits of the tag), the resulting read is not bounded to precede the COPY tag's own offset and can run past the end of the input buffer. An attacker controlled COPY offset can land inside a previously decoded value rather than on a tag boundary, planting a byte that the decoder reads as a SHORT_BINARY tag and consuming up to 31 following bytes from the heap as a class name (OBJECT path) or hash key (HASH path).

• https://github.com/Sereal/Sereal/commit/303a2c69cdba80bf37a3ff43461e0aa78198a7a3.patch
• https://metacpan.org/release/YVES/Sereal-Decoder-5.005/changes