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CryptX-0.087_004
⭐ Starred 36 / Crypt::Cipher::Camellia
Security Advisories (3)
CVE-2026-41564 (2026-04-23)

CryptX versions before 0.088 for Perl do not reseed the Crypt::PK PRNG state after forking. The Crypt::PK::RSA, Crypt::PK::DSA, Crypt::PK::DH, Crypt::PK::ECC, Crypt::PK::Ed25519 and Crypt::PK::X25519 modules seed a per-object PRNG state in their constructors and reuse it without fork detection. A Crypt::PK::* object created before `fork()` shares byte-identical PRNG state with every child process, and any randomized operation they perform can produce identical output, including key generation. Two ECDSA or DSA signatures from different processes are enough to recover the signing private key through nonce-reuse key recovery. This affects preforking services such as the Starman web server, where a Crypt::PK::* object loaded at startup is inherited by every worker process.

CVE-2026-41565 (2026-05-28)

CryptX versions before 0.088_001 for Perl have a stack buffer overflow in four AEAD decrypt_verify helpers. The gcm_decrypt_verify, ccm_decrypt_verify, chacha20poly1305_decrypt_verify and eax_decrypt_verify XS routines copied the caller-supplied authentication tag into a fixed 144-byte stack buffer (MAXBLOCKSIZE) without checking the supplied length. A longer tag overwrites the stack past the buffer. Version 0.088 added the clamp to gcm_decrypt_verify, and 0.088_001 added it to the other three. Any caller of an affected helper that forwards an attacker-controlled tag longer than the buffer can trigger the overflow.

CVE-2026-13758 (2026-06-29)

CryptX versions before 0.088_001 for Perl compare AEAD authentication tags in non-constant time in the streaming decrypt_done path. The decrypt_done($tag) form compares it against the computed tag with memNE (memcmp() != 0), which short-circuits on the first differing byte, so its run time depends on the number of matching leading bytes. This affects all five AEAD modes: GCM, CCM, ChaCha20Poly1305, EAX and OCB. The one-shot *_decrypt_verify helpers are unaffected; they verify the tag inside libtomcrypt with a constant-time comparison. The timing difference is a tag-verification oracle. An attacker who can submit many candidate tags for the same nonce, ciphertext and associated data while measuring the timing precisely enough may recover the expected tag byte by byte and forge a message that verifies.

NAME

Crypt::Cipher::Camellia - Symmetric cipher Camellia, key size: 128/192/256 bits

SYNOPSIS

### example 1
use Crypt::Mode::CBC;

my $key = '...'; # length has to be valid key size for this cipher
my $iv = '...';  # 16 bytes
my $cbc = Crypt::Mode::CBC->new('Camellia');
my $ciphertext = $cbc->encrypt("secret data", $key, $iv);

### example 2 (slower)
use Crypt::CBC;
use Crypt::Cipher::Camellia;

my $key = '...'; # length has to be valid key size for this cipher
my $iv = '...';  # 16 bytes
my $cbc = Crypt::CBC->new( -cipher=>'Cipher::Camellia', -key=>$key, -iv=>$iv );
my $ciphertext = $cbc->encrypt("secret data");

DESCRIPTION

This module implements the Camellia cipher. Provided interface is compliant with Crypt::CBC module.

BEWARE: This module implements just elementary "one-block-(en|de)cryption" operation - if you want to encrypt/decrypt generic data you have to use some of the cipher block modes - check for example Crypt::Mode::CBC, Crypt::Mode::CTR or Crypt::CBC (which will be slower).

METHODS

new

$c = Crypt::Cipher::Camellia->new($key);
#or
$c = Crypt::Cipher::Camellia->new($key, $rounds);

encrypt

$ciphertext = $c->encrypt($plaintext);

decrypt

$plaintext = $c->decrypt($ciphertext);

keysize

$c->keysize;
#or
Crypt::Cipher::Camellia->keysize;
#or
Crypt::Cipher::Camellia::keysize;

blocksize

$c->blocksize;
#or
Crypt::Cipher::Camellia->blocksize;
#or
Crypt::Cipher::Camellia::blocksize;

max_keysize

$c->max_keysize;
#or
Crypt::Cipher::Camellia->max_keysize;
#or
Crypt::Cipher::Camellia::max_keysize;

min_keysize

$c->min_keysize;
#or
Crypt::Cipher::Camellia->min_keysize;
#or
Crypt::Cipher::Camellia::min_keysize;

default_rounds

$c->default_rounds;
#or
Crypt::Cipher::Camellia->default_rounds;
#or
Crypt::Cipher::Camellia::default_rounds;

SEE ALSO